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What drives firm profitability? A comparison of the US and EU food 
processing industry 
 
Abstract: This article analyzes persistence and the drivers of profitability in US and EU food processing using 
GMM estimations. Due to different firm size structures first comparable samples of US and EU food processors 
are derived using Propensity Score Matching. The GMM results indicate that profit persistence in food processing 
is lower than in other manufacturing sectors. Firm-specific drivers of profitability are size and financial risk. 
Regarding industry characteristics concentration and the growth rate significantly influence profitability. The 
findings provide insights for the management of food processing firms as well as for policy decisions aiming to 
enhance the competitiveness of firms in the food processing sector.  




The analysis of firm profits that diverge from the competitive profit rate is one of the pivotal 
fields of study within economic research (e.g. Porter 1980; Barney 1991; McGahan and Porter 
2003; Hirsch and Gschwandtner 2013).  
From a theoretical point of view the neoclassical model of perfect competition postulates 
that firm profits above or below the competitive norm cannot persist in the long run as such  
profits are immediately driven back to the norm by competitive forces (e.g. Carlton and Perloff 
2005). Nevertheless, in the real world, profits that diverge from the competitive norm are, 
despite declining trade barriers, a rather usual phenomenon for many industrial markets.  
 Starting with the contributions of Mueller (1986, 1990) many empirical studies have shown 
that industries are in general characterized by a large number of firms generating profits that 
diverge from the competitive norm in the long run -a phenomenon usually referred to as profit 
persistence. The majority of those studies either considers entire economies or is restricted to 
firms operating in manufacturing sectors of specific countries. Some important studies on profit 
persistence include: Waring (1996), Wiggins and Ruefli (2002), Chacar and Vissa (2005), and 
Gschwandtner (2005), for the US manufacturing sector; Glen et al. (2001) for 7 developing 
countries; Goddard et al., (2005), Bou and Satorra (2007), Pattitoni et al. (2014), and Gallizo 
et al. (2014) for the EU manufacturing and service sector.  
While most previous studies on food industry performance, focus on more specific aspects 
such as the impact of retailer concentration on industry innovation (Weiss and Wittkopp 2005) 
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or the influence of diversification strategies on profit (Dorsey and Boland 2009) as yet, only a 
few studies have explicitly analyzed the persistence and drivers of profits deviating from the 
norm in the food sector. For the US food economy Schumacher and Boland (2005) using 
variance decomposition methods find that industry effects are more important for profit 
persistence than corporate effects. Nevertheless, Schumacher and Boland (2005) do not 
quantify the firm and industry characteristics (such as firm size or industry concentration) which 
determine the extent of profits deviating from the norm. Chaddad and Mondelli (2013) apply 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to the US food economy to determine the impact of 
industry and firm effects as well as those structural factors that affect the performance of firms. 
They find that firm effects outweigh industry effects and that structural firm- and industry 
variables such as corporate R&D intensity and industry capital intensity are significant drivers 
of firm profits. Hirsch et al. (2014) apply HLM to the EU food processing industry. Their results 
also provide evidence for dominant firm effects. Furthermore, firm size and industry 
concentration are identified as drivers of performance. However, the HLM approach is of static 
nature and not suitable to capture the dynamics of firm profits over time. Nevertheless, it can 
be assumed that the conditional probability that a firm will achieve a specific degree of profits 
deviating from the norm in the future is a dynamic function of deviating profits in the past (e.g. 
Hsiao 2007; Baltagi 2008). Due to this reason Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) implement a 
dynamic panel model to a large panel of EU food processors over the period 1996-2008. They 
show that due to high market saturation and strong bargaining pressure from the retail sector 
the persistence of profits deviating from the norm in the EU food processing industry is 
significantly lower compared to other manufacturing sectors. As the main profit driver they 
identify firm size as besides economies of scale larger firms are in a better bargaining position 
against retailers.  
In summary as yet no study exists that estimates the degree of profit persistence as well as 
the drivers of profits deviating from the norm in the US food sector based on a dynamic 
approach. This is important as profits and profit persistence are changing over time. Our 
primary objective is therefore to provide evidence on the drivers and persistence of firm profits 
deviating from the norm in the US food processing industry by analyzing a sample of 104 
publicly quoted US food processors over the time span 1996-2014. Moreover, we aim to 
compare the US results to a matched sample of EU food processing firms. We advance the 
literature by first applying propensity score matching (PSM) in order to derive a sample of EU 
firms which is comparable to the US sample. This is necessary due to significant structural 
differences between the US and EU food processing industry -in particular regarding firm size 
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as well as poor data availability for small-scale firms in the US. In addition to avoid biases in 
the comparison of US and EU food processors we assess in how far firms in the analyzed 
samples are affected by industry specific events such as M&A waves, the economic crisis or 
ownership structure.  
Subsequently, we apply the GMM dynamic panel estimator to the US and the matched EU 
panel to determine the extent of profit persistence as well as those factors that have an impact 
on firm profits deviating from the norm. The US results are the first of this kind and we identify 
significant differences to the results of the matched EU panel. These differences may have 
important management and policy implications. 
In the next section we present the theoretical background based on which the drivers of firm 
profitability are identified. Subsequently the econometrics used to match the US and EU panel 
and to estimate the persistence and drivers of firm profits deviating from the norm are described. 
We then provide a comparison of US and EU food processing as well as a description of the 
data. This is followed by the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
and implications derived. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Classical industrial organization theory and in particular the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm assumes that industry characteristics which determine the extent of entry 
barriers and competition are the main determinant of firm performance. Among those 
characteristics are the degree of concentration as well as the size and growth rate of an industry 
(Bain 1956, 1968; Porter 1980). While the SCP has been heavily criticized for its assumption 
of a direct impact of industry structure on profitability (e.g. Tirole 1988) the Market-Based 
View (MBV), as a dynamic extension of the SCP, additionally considers the strategic 
positioning of firms within the industry (Welge and Al-Laham 2008). Consequently, besides 
industry structure strategic management literature stresses the importance of business-specific 
resources as determinants of profitability (Goddard et al. 2005). According to Penrose (1959) 
firms are to be interpreted as bundles of physical and intangible resources. Divergence of 
performance between firms, emerges due to differences in endowment with those resources. 
According to the resource based view (RBV), firms endowed with specific valuable, rare and 
inimitable resources are more competitive and hence outperform the market (Barney 1991; 
Peteraf 1993). Those  resources include tangible i.e. financial and physical factors of production 
as well as intangible factors such as technology and reputation (Claver et al. 2002; Goddard et 
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al. 2005). When estimating the impact of firm specific resources in particular firm size, market 
share, growth, age, advertising, R&D, patents and financial risk have been identified as 
empirical determinants by previous literature (e.g. Yurtoglu 2004; Chaddad and Mondelli, 
2013). 
IQWKH¶Va supplementary strand of research known as µ1HZ(PSLULFDO,QGXVWULDO
2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶OLWHUDWXUH1(,2KDVHPHUJHGHJ%UHVQDKDQNEIO studies model the 
strategic and competitive behavior of firms on the basis of game theory and structural 
econometric approaches. Those models enable to consider more detailed industry- and firm-
specific factors than what modeling based on the MBV and the RBV can capture. Among those 
factors are demand structures, cost advantages and collusive behavior that decreases 
competition. However, while NEIO provides a useful background for case studies, as it allows 
for a detailed modeling of specific sub-industries (e.g. dairy processing or meat processing), we 
aim to provide generalizable insights of profitability across food industries based on the 
structural relationships suggested by the MBV and the RBV. (Kadiyali et al., 2001) 
 
3. Methodology 
We first employ PSM, a method commonly applied in observational studies to eliminate 
selection biases, to construct an EU sample that matches the 104 publicly quoted US firms 
(Huang et al. 2013). Afterwards, we quantify profit persistence as well as the factors that have 
an influence on the degree of firm profits deviating from the norm for both samples.  
3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
PSM is commonly applied in observational studies to eliminate selection biases that arise if 
observations are not randomly assigned to receive a specific treatment (Heinrich et al. 2010). 
The main objective of PSM is to match an untreated group to a group that receives a specific 
treatment such that the observations of the untreated group can be compared to those of the 
treated group regarding all attributes except for the treatment (Huang et al. 2013).1 
In general, PSM can be applied to settings where a treatment (e.g. medication, labor market 
policy, agricultural policy intervention) is given to a specific group of individuals. The majority 
of research focuses on the outcome of the treatment, referred to as WKHµDYHUDJHWUHDWPHQWHIIHFW
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 PSM has been employed in diverse fields of study such as the evaluation of labor market policies (e.g. Dehejia 
and Wahba 1999), or medical and pharmacoepidemiological research (e.g. Perkins et al. 2000; Austin 2008) as 
well as the agribusiness sector (Cavatassi et al. 2011; Bontemps et al. 2013; Key and McBride 2014) (Caliendo 




on the treated (ATT)¶, by comparing the treated sample with a constructed matched sample of 
untreated observations. Algebraically the ATT can be defined as:  
> @ > @1|)0(1|)1(    DYEDYEATT ,        (1) 
where Y(D) is either the outcome of an observation that has been treated (if D = 1) or of an 
observation that has not been exposed to treatment (if D = 0). Thus, the first conditional 
expectation in (1) refers to the mean outcome of the treatment across observations in the treated 
group while the second one indicates the mean outcome of observations in the treated group 
assuming that they did not receive treatment. However as > @1|)0(  DYE  is not observable a 
suitable substitute has to be constructed. Simply using the mean outcome value across all 
untreated observations > @0|)0(  DYE  leads to biased results as observations are not randomly 
assigned to treated and untreated groups. Thus, those factors (X) which have an impact on the 
likelihood of receiving treatment also have an impact on the treatment outcome (Caliendo and 
Kopeining 2005; Briggeman et al. 2009). One possible approach to construct a suitable proxy 
for > @1|)0(  DYE  is to use a balancing score )()|1( XPXDP    which indicates the 
probability that an observation receives treatment, given the covariates X (Heckman et al. 1997; 
Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). )(XP  is usually referred to as an observation¶V Propensity 
Score (PS) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Becker and Ichino 2002). 36¶VDUHFDOFXODWHGXVLQJD
probit regression where the binary dependent variable takes a value of 1 for observations in the 
treated group and a value of 0 for non-treated observations. As independent variables (X) those 
factors are included which have an impact on receiving the treatment and on the treatment-
outcome (Rubin and Thomas 1996; Heckman et al. 1997; Smith and Todd 2005). The estimated 
values of the dependent variable of this regression constitute the observations¶ 36¶V. Using the 
36¶VWhe ATT can be calculated as:  
> @ > @^ `)(,0|)0()(,1|)1())(( 1)|( XPDYEXPDYEEXPATT DXP     ,        (2) 
where 1|)(  DXPE  GHQRWHV WKH PHDQ RYHU WKH DUHD RI RYHUODSSLQJ 36¶V IRU the treated and 
untreated group (Briggeman et al. 2009). The RYHUODSSLQJDUHDRI36¶VLVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHDUHD
RIµFRPPRQVXSSRUW¶ (Becker and Ichino 2002; Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Thus, the ATT 
defined by (2) is the average difference in the treatment-outcome variable between the treated 
and the untreated group over the area of common support. While equation (2) is defined over 
the common support area some problems regarding the goodness of the matching can arise 
when solely relying on the common support criterion. First, intervals within the area of common 
support which are characterized by minor overlap between 36¶V RI ERWK JURXSV are not 
considered (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Second, observations ZLWK36¶Vmarginally outside 
6 
 
the area of common support might still be adequate matches for observations of the opposing 
group slightly inside the area of common support (Smith and Todd 2005). In order to eliminate 
this µcommon support problem¶ several matching algorithms can be applied in addition to the 
precondition of common support. We apply radius matching where only those untreated 
observations are included that lie within a specific radius (e.g. 0.05 oU  RI WKH 36¶V RI
observations in the treated group (Becker and Ichino 2002; Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). 
Radius matching accounts for areas with only minor PS overlap within the common support 
interval and considers suitable observations marginally outside this interval (Smith and Todd 
2005).  
Compared to this standard matching procedure our approach is slightly different. We do not 
attempt to match US and EU firms based on propensity scores that are calculated by means of 
all structural firm characteristics and afterwards calculate the ATT (i.e. differences in profits 
deviating from the norm between US and matched EU firms) based on (2). In contrast we take 
the treatment, which in the present case is either being an US or an EU firm, as exogenously 
given and solely match the firms based on the most important structural measure -firm size. 
Afterwards, for both the US and the matched EU panel we estimate the effect of several 
structural firm- and industry variables on the outcome variable, which in the present case is firm 
profit deviating from the norm. For this purpose we apply dynamic panel models based on the 
GMM estimator. The advantage of our approach is that it first provides comparable samples 
regarding the structural characteristic of interest -firm size- and afterwards allows to implement 
the GMM estimator which is the suitable econometric approach to capture the dynamics present 
in the data. The standard matching process described above, in turn, does not adequately 
consider the dynamic time series behavior of firm profits deviating from the norm.  
3.2 Dynamic panel model (GMM estimator) 
Following the matching process we estimate the persistence as well as the drivers of profits 
deviating from the norm for the US and the matched EU panel. Earlier studies analyzing the 
dynamics of firm profits over time (e.g. Mueller 1990; Gschwandtner 2005) employ a simple 
autoregressive process of order one (AR1) estimated with OLS2: 
tiitiiti vc ,1,,   KSOS  ,             (3) 
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where iK  is an unobserved firm-specific effect and ti ,Q is an observation specific error term 
(Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009). In (3) ti ,S  is firm i¶VSURILWDELOLW\ deviating from the norm 
in period t. ti ,S  is defined as the difference between firm i¶VUHWXUQRQDVVHWV52$LQt and 
the competitive norm which is proxied by average industry ROA in t (e.g. Hirsch and 
Gschwandtner 2013). The estimated autoregressive coefficient iOÖ  can then be used for each 
firm as a measure of profit persistence as it indicates the percentage of profits deviating from 
the norm that sustains from period to period. Mean iOÖ  across firms in an industry can serve as 
an indicator for the competitive pressure within this sector as high competition decreases the 
likelihood that profits deviating from the norm persist. Some studies (e.g. Gschwandtner 2012) 
implement a second estimation step by regressing structural firm and industry variables such as 
firm size or industry concentration on iOÖ  in order to explain the latter.  
However, the classical approach has the drawback that applying OLS to (3) leads to 
inconsistent and upward biased estimates of iO  due to an endogeneity bias caused by 
0);( 1, z itiCov KS . Similarly, the fixed effects (within) estimator leads to biased estimates. This 
estimator performs OLS on the equation with each variable adjusted by its mean over time. 
However, fixed effects estimates are still inconsistent and biased as 0);( 1, z iti vCov S , where   
.iiti vvv   reflects the mean-adjusted error term (Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009). Thus, to 
obtain consistent and unbiased estimates we apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator to an extended version of (3):  
tiitij
j
jtiti Zc ,,,1,, )( QKDOSS  ¦             (4) 
The autoregressive coefficient (OÖ ) can then be used as a measure for the degree of profit 
persistence across the analyzed panel of firms. Additionally, a vector of j time-variant structural 
firm and industry specific variables (Z) is added to the model in order to estimate the impact of 
these variables on firm profits deviating from the norm over time. The GMM estimator first-
differentiates the equation eliminating the time invariant firm-specific effect ( iK ). Afterwards, 
based on the assumption of no serial correlation in the error term ( itv ) lags of the endogeneous 
independent variable ( 1, tiS ) can be used as valid instruments to estimate the first-differenced 
equation. Similar to Goddard et al. (2005) the independent variables included in Z are treated 
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as exogenous implying that they can instrument themselves (Andres et al. 2009; Roodman 
2009, Hirsch and Gschwandtner 2013). However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) show based on Monte Carlo simulations that in cases where the autoregressive 
parameter (O ) is large the difference GMM estimator behaves poorly as lagged values of the 
endogeneous independent variable ( 1, tiS ) constitute weak instruments. They extend the 
difference GMM estimator by focusing on a system of first-differenced and levels equations. 
Lagged differences of the endogeneous independent variable ( 1, tiS ) are then used as 
instruments for the levels equation in addition to the lagged values of the independent variable 
which are used as instruments for the first-differenced equation. This estimator is usually 
referred to as system-GMM (Baltagi 2008; Andres et al. 2009).3 We estimate equation (4) using 
the system-GMM estimator and additionally apply OLS as a robustness check and to quantify 
the bias of the classical approach. 
 
4. US and EU food processing industry population and sample 
In this section we first discuss structural characteristics of the US and EU food processing 
industry. We then present the construction, representativeness and descriptive statistics of our 
data and assess the comparability of the derived US and EU samples.  
4.1 US and EU food processing industry 
The first two columns of table 1 compare the US and EU-28 food processing industry based on 
key indicators. The EU-28 food industry is in general larger than the US food processing 
industry having both a higher value of overall sales and a much larger number of firms. The 
number of firms in the EU exceeds the respective US value by a factor of almost 10. In 2011 
the US food processing industry contributes 14.7%, 14.2%, and 10.3%, to total manufacturing 
sales, employees and number of firms, respectively (USDoC 2014). The EU-28 food processing 
industry is characterized by a similarly high economic importance with shares of 14.8% of total 
manufacturing sales and 14.1% in manufacturing employees. However, the EU-28 food 
processing LQGXVWULHV¶VKDUHLQWKHWRWDOQXPEHURIPDQXIDFWXULQJILUPVLVZLWK 13.8% higher 
than in the US (Eurostat 2014). Combined with the much larger number of food processors in 
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 Compared to the classical two-step AR(1) approach GMM has the disadvantage that we can only determine the 




the EU-28 this points towards significantly different size class structures between both 
industries.  
This fact is also highlighted in the lower panel of table 1 which shows a significantly higher 
percentage of small firms in the EU-28 and a much higher percentage of larger firms in the US. 
While almost 80% of the firms in the EU-28 food sector have less than 10 employees, in the 
US only around 50% of the firms are that small. At the same time the percentage of firms with 
more than 20 employees is more than three times as large in the US than in the EU-28. Finally, 
the percentage of firms with more than 500 employees is 13.7 in the US, while in the EU-28 
less than 1% of the firms have more than 250 employees. This significant disparity in the size 
class structure between the US and EU food processing industry can generally be explained by 
historical differences and the large cultural heterogeneity in Europe which hampers an 
upscaling of firms (Wijnands et al. 2007).  
Insert table 1 here 
 
4.2 US and EU dataset 
The US sample was constructed using 6WDQGDUGDQG3RRU¶VCompustat, a commercial database 
on financial information of US publicly quoted firms, and the US economic census (USDoC 
2014). The EU sample is based on AMADEUS, a pan European balance sheet database 
including firms of all legal forms and size classes, and the Eurostat database (Eurostat 2014). 
While Compustat and AMADEUS provide firm-level data the US census and Eurostat serve 
for the construction of variables related to the subsectors of the food processing industry. Our 
analysis focuses on the time span 1996-2014.  
When constructing the data panels it is important to consider the effect of possible 
survivorship biases on profitability that can occur due to bankruptcy or mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) (e.g. Gschwandtner 2005). Particularly the food industry is known for its high M&A 
activity and several studies have shown that M&As significantly influence not only the size and 
growth of firms (e.g. Connor and Geithman 1988) but also firm profitability (e.g. Bhuyan 2002). 
While historic merger waves occurred in the food sector during the 1980s (Connor and Geitham 
1988) smaller waves also occurred during the period of analysis in the present study (Herger et 
al. 2008). Between 1997 and 2004 the US food industry was ranked number one globally 
regarding the number of food sector M&As (Herger et al. 2008). Similarly, Kastrinaki and 
Stoneman (2011) show that between 1983 and 2007 the EU food industry has accounted for 
around 20% of all EU merger activity. Moreover, Kastrinaki and Stoneman (2011) reveal 
common international patterns of food industry M&A activity while Herger et al. (2008) point 
10 
 
towards a high share of cross boarder acquisitions in the US and EU food industry. Although, 
our data does not contain the information necessary to quantify the effect of M&As on 
profitability those findings indicate that both sectors were similarly affected by M&A activity 
during the analyzed period.  
Furthermore, it is important to consider possible effects of firm entry and exit.  For example, 
Gschwandtner (2005) shows that surviving firms have in general higher profit persistence than 
firms that exit the market due to bankruptcy. We minimize the impact of possible survivorship 
bias due to bankruptcy as well as biases caused by a negligence of firm entry during the 
analyzed time span by employing the lowest feasible inclusion criterion regarding firm/year 
observations. Accordingly, we kept all firms with at least 6 years of available ROA data in the 
samples as this constitutes the minimum time series dimension necessary to adequately model 
the dynamics of profitability based on the GMM estimator (Baltagi 2008). Additionally, 
AMADEUS only reports 1.4% of exiting firms as bankrupt while the majority of firms exiting 
the database during the analyzed time span are either acquired or part of merger activity. 
Although for the US sample similar information is not available the majority of firms with less 
than 6 ROA observations shows missing values in the middle of the analyzed time frame 
implying that data incompleteness in those cases is not a sign for firm exit but rather of flaws 
in the database. The extent of survivorship bias due to bankruptcy in both samples should 
therefore not be significant. 
In order to construct the US sample we first selected all 409 firms active in any of the 6-digit 
NAICS4  codes between 311111 and 312140, i.e. firms that operate in food and beverage 
manufacturing. We deleted all firms with less than 6 years of available ROA data and removed 
outliers outside the interval of +/- 3 standard deviations around the mean leading to a final 
sample of 104 firms. On average 8.3 years of data are available for each firm. Besides ROA, 
data on firm size, firm JURZWK PDUNHW VKDUH DV ZHOO DV ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO ULVN LV DYDLODEOH to 
capture the impact of physical, human and organizational firm specific resources in accordance 
with the RBV. Finally, in line with the MBV concentration as well as size and growth of 6-digit 
food processing subsectors are added to the sample from the US census (USDoC 2014) to 
capture the impact of entry barriers and competition.    
The EU sample was constructed similarly by including all firms active in any 4-digit NACE 
industry between DA1511 and DA1598 (i.e. the manufacturing of food and beverages) during 
1996-2014 with at least 6 ROA observations. Due to data availability the EU sample is restricted 
to the 5 countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. However, with contributions of 
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 NAICS and NACE are the statistical classifications of economic activities in the US and the EU, respectively.  
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53.2%, 41.3% and 55.5% to total EU-28 food processing industry sales, employees and number 
of firms, respectively a significant share of the EU-28 food processing industry is covered by 
those 5 countries (cf. last column of table 1). Germany, the largest contributor to EU food 
processing industry turnover with 17.8 % (Eurostat 2014) could not be included due to a lack 
of data as non-publicly quoted firms had no legal obligations to publicize accounting data until 
the year 2007 (Hirsch and Schiefer 2016). All observations outside +/- 3 standard deviations 
around the mean were dropped and industry data related to concentration as well as size and 
growth of 4-digit food processing subsectors IURP (XURVWDW¶V VWUXFWXUDO EXVLQHVV VWDWLVWLFV
(Eurostat 2014) was added. As AMADEUS comprises firms of all legal forms (limited 
partnerships, private, publicly quoted, and cooperatives) and size classes the resulting sample 
comprises 3,541 firms and is significantly larger than the US sample. On average 13.8 years of 
data are available for each firm.5 We use this sample as a basis to construct a sample that 
matches the 104 publicly quoted US firms.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of firm and industry characteristics in the US and the 
EU samples. We first describe the variables for the US sample and the initial EU sample. The 
results for the matched EU sample in the third column will be discussed below subsequent to 
the matching procedure. As variable definitions are not necessarily identical between the two 
databases we selected all variables under careful consideration of comparability based on the 
definitions of individual balance sheet items from the database providers.6 
ROA is calculated as the quotient of ILUPV¶SURILWORVVEHIRUHWD[DWLRQSOXV LQWHUHVW7, and 
total assets. There has been a vast debate regarding the suitability of accounting profit measures 
such as ROA as those measures can suffer from biases due to profit smoothing or cross 
subsidization (e.g. Fisher and McGowan 1983; Long and Ravenscraft 1984). Some studies 
therefore use alternatives such as economic value added (EVA) developed by Stern Steward 
and Co., which measures the economic returns generated for shareholders or Tobins q. 
However, Biddle et al. (1997) illustrate that EVA is outperformed by balance sheet earnings as 
a performance proxy as returns and firm values are more strongly correlated with earnings than 
with EVA. Therefore, to assure comparability to previous literature we use ROA as the proxy 
for firm profitability. Moreover, correlation coefficients between ROA and the value added 
measure provided by AMADEUS exceed 0.8 and are significant at p<0.01 for each year and 
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 An earlier version of this EU sample covering the years 1996-2008 has been analyzed regarding profit persistence 
by Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013). 
6
 Detailed definitions of all variables from the database providers can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. 
7
 To make ROA independent of the source of funds used, interest has to be included in the numerator. 
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country8. According to table 2 ROA is on average significantly lower in the US sample than in 
the EU sample pointing towards higher competition in the US, maybe due to the lower 
concentration in the retail sector and less potential subsidies than in the EU.  
The average firm size, measured by firms¶ total assets, is with $3.3 bn. significantly higher 
in the US sample than in the EU sample where the respective value is only $25.9 m. Although 
this divergence confirms the results for the population in table 1, small firms are significantly 
underrepresented in the US sample caused by the fact that Compustat only provides data for 
publicly quoted firms which are usually larger. As can be seen from the size class distribution 
at the bottom of the table, similar to the population, we have mainly large firms in the US 
sample (84.0%) and mainly small and micro firms in the EU sample (87.8%). However, the 
yearly growth factor of firms` total assets, is on average higher in the EU than in the US. 
Market share was calculated for each firm as the ratio of its sales to the overall sales in the 
NAICS/NACE sector in which the firm operates. Surprisingly, average market share of firms 
in the US sample is with 3.2% only slightly larger than in the EU sample where the average 
firm has a market share of 2.2%. However, as will become apparent below in comparison to the 
EU sample the US sample is characterized by a larger share of firms that operate in subsectors 
that generate higher outputs and vice versa. Hence, despite the much larger average firm size 
market shares in the US sample do not significantly exceed market shares in the EU sample. 
Firms in the US sample engage on average significantly less in short-term and long-term 
financial risk than firms in the EU. Average short-term risk, measured by the reciprocal of a 
ILUP¶VFXUUHQWUDWLR, i.e. the quotient of current liabilities to current assets, is almost twice as 
large in the EU. Similarly, long-term risk measured by the firms gearing ratio, i.e. the quotient 
of non-current liabilities to shareholder funds is lower in the US (1.3) than it is in the EU sample 
(1.4).  
We now turn our attention to industry related variables. As suggested by Cotterill (1986) 
concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)9. The HHI is calculated 
as the sum of the squared market shares of firms10 in each 4-digit NACE and 6-digit NAICS 
subsector. Mean HHI values are below the 0.15 threshold of moderately concentrated markets 
in both the US and EU sample indicating that the majority of firms operate in industries that are 
characterized by low concentration (USDoJ 2010).  
                                                          
8
 This only holds for the EU-5 countries as VA is not available for the US. 
9
 Cotterill (1986) shows that the HHI outperforms the four-firm concentration ratio as a concentration measure. 
10
 For industries with less than 50 firms the total number of firms is used for the calculation. 
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Industry size and yearly growth factors are measured by the sales of each 6-digit NAICS and 
4-digit NACE food processing subsector, respectively. Despite the lower number of total food 
processing sales in the population average industry size is significantly larger in the US sample 
($20.3 billion vs. $6.6 billion). This is due to the fact that in the EU sample a larger fraction of 
firms is active in subsectors that generate lower outputs (e.g. 1$&('$µ0DQXIDFWXUHRI
ZLQHV¶RU'$µ0DQXIDFWXUHRIJUDLQPLOOSURGXFWV¶). Nevertheless, firms in the EU sample 
operate in industries that grow stronger as the average yearly growth factor of industry sales is 
with 1.03 significantly larger than in the US sample where growth stagnates.  
Insert table 2 here 
When comparing the EU and US food industry another important question refers to the 
ownership of the firms and its impact on profitability. It is well known that almost 45% of the 
US food economy has an ownership structure that is regarded as closely held and that this type 
of ownership can significantly influence firm profitability (Boland et al. 2008). For example, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Boland et al. (2008) show that the percentage of firms in the 
US food industry with a significant share of family-ownership is particularly high. Similarly, 
in the EU food economy in most industries a significant number of family owned firms can be 
found (Wijnands et al. 2007, Palpacuer and Tozanli 2008). For example, Mandl (2008) shows 
that the share of family businesses in the EU food sector is 27%. 11  Nevertheless, while 
AMADEUS provides a unique coverage of the EU food industry`s population of firms it is 
questionable whether closely held firms are sufficiently covered by the Compustat database. 
Therefore, to assess the degree of family ownership in the US sample we used information 
about insider/individual ownership available in S&P Capital IQ12 which can be assumed to be 
highly correlated with family ownership. 32.9% of the companies in our sample had an 
insider/individual ownership of 10% or more. The percentage of firms with 30% or more 
insider/individual ownership and at least one insider on the board is 18.4 and the percentage of 
firms with 50% or more insider/individual ownership and at least one insider on the board is 
9.5. If we compare the average ROA for these firms with the average ROA of the firms with 
less than 50% insider/individual ownership we find that companies with a higher percentage of 
insider/individual ownership perform on average better and that the difference between the 
means is statistically significant at the 5% level. This seems to confirm the results of Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) and Boland et al. (2008) where it is found that family ownership is both 
                                                          
11
 Prominent examples of family-owned food sector firms are Campbell and Mars for the US and the Italian pasta 
producer Barilla for the EU (Boland et al. 2008, Palpacuer and Tozanli 2008). 
12
 Available at www.capitaliq.com 
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SUHYDOHQWDQG WKDWD µJUHDWHUSHUFHQWDJHRIHTXLW\KHOGE\ LQVLGHUVVXFKDVPDQDJHPHQWDQG
family PHPEHUVOHDGVWRJUHDWHUSHUIRUPDQFH¶ We therefore infer that our samples adequately 
reflect the presence of family- ownership and the respective impact on profitability. 
 
 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Propensity score matching results 
Propensity scores are estimated using a probit model where the binary dependent variable takes 
a value of 1 for observations in the US sample and a value of 0 for observations in the EU 
sample. As independent variable we use firm size as the structural characteristic of interest. In 
order to avoid sample selection bias, for the matching process we use firm sales instead of total 
assets, our prime firm size measure. This is necessary as we aim to afterwards include total 
assets as an independent variable to explain profits deviating from the norm. The probit-
regression results indicate that firm size measured by sales has a significantly positive impact 
on the probability that a firm is in the US sample. 
The third column of table 2 shows the firm size distributions after the matching process. 
From the initial EU sample 1,395 firms are identified, based on the area of common support 
and the radius matching algorithm, to match the 104 US firms.13 The fraction of micro firms is 
significantly reduced in the EU sample from 64.5% to 22.4%. However, the fraction of large 
firms remains significantly smaller in the EU sample than in the US sample.  
The balancing property serves as a goodness measure for the matching process. In the present 
case it is fulfilled at p<0.01 which indicates that the size of firms in the US and the matched EU 
sample is similar even within PS subsets (i.e. quantiles) over the common support area 
(Cavatassi et al. 2011). Additionally, the reduction in the standardized bias14 can be used as a 
measure for the success of the matching. Previous studies interpret a reduction of this bias by 
around 3% as sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005). Nevertheless, the matching process 
only leads to a reduction of the bias by 1.1% indicating that significant differences in size 
classes remain. Those also become evident from table 2 which indicates that although average 
firm size in the EU sample increases from $25.9 m. to $61.0 m. in total assets this value remains 
significantly smaller than the US value of $3.3 bn. Nonetheless, the matched EU sample likely 
                                                          
13
 Several estimation attempts with different radii (0.15, 0.1 and 0.05) led to identical results. 
14
 The standardized bias is calculated as: ))()((*5.0)( 0101 xVxVxxSB  , where )(, 11 xVx and 
)(, 00 xVx are mean and variance of firm size in the US and the matched EU sample, respectively. 
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represents a similar part of the size class distribution of the EU food processing industry as the 
one represented by the 104 US firms. We suppose that this approach is more meaningful than 
simply focusing on EU firms that have exactly the same size as the US firms as firms would be 
less comparable regarding their competitive situation.15 
5.2 Explaining profits deviating from the norm 
The results of the GMM dynamic panel estimation are presented in table 3 in the first two 
columns. For each variable we also calculated the statistical difference between the US and EU-
5 coefficient.  
Results indicate that the short-run persistence parameter (OÖ ) is positive and significant in 
both samples, meaning that past year`s profits have a significant impact on this year`s profits 
and therefore profit persistence exists. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the 
US and EU persistence coefficient at the 5%-level which confirms that the matching process 
has generated US and EU firms that operate in comparable competitive situations in their 
respective industries. The OÖ  values of 0.293 for the US and 0.340 for the EU are lower 
compared to other manufacturing sectors indicating higher competitive pressure in the food 
processing industry.16 For example, Gschwandtner (2012) using GMM with a similar set of 
explanatory variables finds OÖ  values between 0.549 and 0.722 for the entire US manufacturing 
sector while Goddard et al. (2005) find OÖ values between 0.323 and 0.452 for entire 
manufacturing sectors of the same five EU countries.  
We now focus on firm-specific characteristics that in accordance with the RBV should affect 
profitability. The impact of firm size on profitability deviating from the norm is positive and 
significant in both samples. Moreover, the coefficients are not significantly different. Hence 
economies of scale seem to play an important role in the US and EU food processing industry. 
Moreover, larger size allows to better deal with pre-market approval procedures, advertising 
costs, to establish reputation and to counteract the market power of large retailers (Wijnands et 
al. 2007). Firm growth in turn has no significant impact on profits deviating from the norm.  
Similarly, market share is insignificant both in the EU and in the US. Usually a higher market 
share is expected to have a positive impact on profits deviating from the norm. However, firms 
                                                          
15
 An alternative matching strategy would have been to first ensure homogeneity across EU firms by performing 
PSM for all 10 combinations between the 5 EU countries. However, this was neglected as similar to Hirsch and 
Gschwandtner (2013) we want to consider the EU food processing industry in its entirety as a single market of 
goods and services. 
16
 Following Goddard et al. (2005) for the EU estimation an (insignificant) 3rd order lag of the dependent variable 
had to be retained to handle problems of second order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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with high market shares may also have transparency problems and diseconomies of scope that 
counteract the positive influence leading to an insignificant effect in the end. Moreover, Prescott 
et al. (1986) show that the impact of market share is influenced by the external environment in 
which firms operate and can therefore also be negative. 
Short-term financial risk negatively impacts in both samples and the coefficients are not 
significantly different. A negative impact has also been found by Hirsch and Gschwandtner 
(2013) for the EU. Short-term risk may put high pressure on the financial stress of firms and is 
expected to have a negative impact. Long-term financial risk (gearing) however, may help the 
firm to invest in R&D and recover from eventual financial distress. Thus, it may enable firms 
to make investments that help the company to grow and to reach a specific established market 
position or a critical firm size that ensures its competitiveness. Furthermore, Chaddad and 
Mondelli (2013) mention that financial pressure of debt reduces free cash flow, and may lead 
managers to invest more wisely and not to waste firm resources in perquisites and unprofitable 
growth. Accordingly, a positive and significant impact of long-term debt is detected for the US. 
However, the impact of long-term debt is insignificant in the EU and the coefficient is 
significantly smaller compared to the US. Goddard et al. (2005) who find a negative impact of 
gearing for EU manufacturing firms FRQFOXGH WKDW µhighly leveraged firms may suffer in 
increasingly competitive markets, as they need to use a higher proportion of gross profits to 
service debt¶. For the EU it is hence likely the case that the positive and negative effects of long 
term debt neutralize each other leading to the insignificant impact. 
The focus shall now be on those structural industry factors which according to the MBV 
determine the degree of entry barriers and competition. The results show that the impact of 
industry concentration is positive in both samples although only significant in the EU. 
Moreover, the respective coefficient is significantly higher in the EU. For the EU it therefore 
appears to be the case that high concentration prevents entry, leading to less competition and 
higher profits deviating from the norm. Nevertheless, strong concentration can also lead to 
intense rivalry between the few large firms resulting in a negative impact. Hence for the US it 
is likely the case that both effects cancel each other out leading to the insignificant impact of 
concentration.  
Industry size does not impact significantly on profits deviating from the norm and there is 
no significant difference between the two samples. However, there is a significant difference 
between the US and EU in the impact of industry growth on profitability deviating from the 
norm. While the impact is positive and significant in the EU, it is significantly negative in the 
US. This indicates that US firms likely engage in stronger non-profit competition such as 
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advertising when the industry grows which in turn reduces profitability deviating from the 
norm. In contrast firms in growing EU industries appear to behave more cooperatively which 
increases their profitability on average.  
Regarding goodness of fit parameters the Wald statistics indicate the overall significance of 
both models at the 1% level. Lags of second or higher order have been used as instruments for 
the endogeneous independent variable in both models and the Hansen test does not reject the 
null hypothesis that this is the correct implementation of instruments. Moreover, for none of 
the models the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation is rejected indicating the 
consistency of the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). Finally, the OLS results in 
columns 3 and 4 are used as robustness checks. If the GMM results are correct then the 
autoregressive coefficient shall be below the OLS results and we can observe that this is the 
case for both samples. Moreover, the OLS coefficients on explanatory firm- and industry 
characteristics reflect those generated by the GMM estimator indicating robustness of the 
results.  
Insert table 3 here 
Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 present specifications to assess the effect of the economic crisis 
where observations falling in the time span of the crisis (2008-2009) are excluded17. The effect 
is reflected by an increase in the short-run persistence measure (OÖ ) in the US and EU to 0.360 
and 0.372, respectively. However, this increase is not statistically significant confirming that 
the food industry is a rather crisis proof sector (Lienhardt 2004). The impact of the remaining 
explanatory variables remains constant with the exception of long-term debt in the US where 
the respective coefficient remains positive but becomes insignificant. Moreover, the difference 
to the respective EU coefficient becomes insignificant. This may suggest that during 
macroeconomic crises debt can enable US firms to make investments that lead to growth and a 
specific critical firm size and market position that ensures competitiveness.   
 
6. Conclusions 
The food processing industries in the US and in the EU differ strongly with respect to the size 
of firms with US food processors being on average significantly larger than firms in the EU 
food processing industry. When it comes to empirical analyses of US and EU food processors¶ 
profitability the divergence regarding size is amplified by low data availability for smaller US 
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 We have moreover estimated specifications where the time frame of the economic crisis was captured through 
dummy variables. However, the respective coefficients showed no significant impact and the impact of all other 
coefficients remained unchanged. These results are available upon request.  
18 
 
food processors. Therefore, PSM has been used to derive samples of comparable firm size. In 
addition to assess how well integrated US and EU food processors have been during the 
analyzed period we discuss the impact of industry specific events such as M&A waves, the 
economic crisis as well as ownership structure on profitability in both regions.  
Subsequently, we have analyzed the drivers of profit persistence in the US food processing 
sector and provide a comparison to the results of the matched EU sample. To our knowledge, 
such an analysis -in particular for the US- has not been carried out before. 
We find that profit persistence of food processing firms is lower compared to other 
manufacturing sectors both in the US and the EU indicating a high degree of competitive 
pressure. Moreover, the results show that the food industry is a rather crisis proof sector as food 
processors` profit persistence was only marginally affected by the economic crisis. 
The main drivers of profitability deviating from the norm turn out to be firmV¶ size and 
financial risk. In both regions larger firms achieve a higher level of profits deviating from the 
norm, a result that has also been previously obtained for the EU (Hirsch and Gschwandtner 
2013). Thus, large firms may be able to perform more advertising, have higher consumer 
reputation and are better able to cope with competition pressures. While short-term financial 
risk in turn affects profitability negatively in both regions due to increased financial stress of 
firms a significant difference between the US and the EU can be detected regarding the impact 
of long-term financial risk. While long-term risk has no significant impact on profit deviating 
from the norm in the EU it impacts positively on firms in the US when observations that fall 
into the period of the economic crisis and its aftermaths are included. As discussed before, long-
term debt can enable firms to make the necessary investments that help to ensure 
competitiveness in times of crisis. Finally, firms in the US and the EU differ with respect to the 
impact of concentration and industry growth on profit deviating from the norm. For food 
industry subsectors in the EU high concentration seems to prevent entry, leading to less 
competition and higher profits deviating from the norm while negative effects of concentration 
on profitability due to e.g. intense rivalry between the few large firms cannot be detected.  
Regarding industry growth, in the EU the fact that the industry as a whole grows may impact 
positively on the perception of FRQVXPHUVDQGPD\LQFUHDVHILUPV¶ profit. Contrarily, in the US 
industry growth may lead to more ferocious competition processes which in turn impacts 
negatively on firms¶profit deviating from the norm.  
Some shortcomings of this article are the omission of important intangible firm-specific 
resources such as R&D activity, patents, and reputation due to data unavailability. Second, 
although we infer that M&A activity during the analyzed time period has affected both food 
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sectors to a similar degree the present data does not allow for an investigation of its effect on 
profits deviating from the norm. Moreover our data only allows to quantify the impact of 
family/insider ownership for the US industry while respective data is not available for the EU. 
Third, compared to NEIO approaches which allow a detailed modeling of specific sub-
industries the present analysis can only provide overarching insights on the structural drivers 
of profitability across industries of the food sector. However, the food industry is affected by a 
large number of food contamination incidents and food scandals that occur locally or affect 
specific food industry subsectors and which seem to appear with equal regularity in both 
regions.18  While the relevance of such incidents cannot be assessed by our holistic approach 
NEIO would allow for a more detailed modelling of the effects on firm profitability in the 
affected subsectors. 
The results have not only purely descriptive value but can also be useful when designing 
management implications and policies aimed at supporting food sector firms or the food sector 
as a whole. This is important as today firms are facing economic circumstances characterized 
by reduced entry barriers and possibilities to operate in previously hardly accessible foreign 
markets. Those developments are a consequence of intensified globalization represented by 
trade agreements such as the NAFTA or the formation of a single market for goods and services 
within the EU. However, these deregulations of borders and international trade have led to a 
significant intensification of competition among firms across many sectors. The comparably 
low short-run persistence values (OÖ ) which have been estimated for the US and EU food 
industry also reflected this development.  
Moreover, pressure on the margins and competitiveness of food processors is intensified by 
increasing uncertainty in raw material markets and strong concentration in retail sectors. 
(Schiefer 2011). While five-firm concentration ratios already exceed 70% in many EU member 
countries concentration is slightly weaker in the US retail sector, but shows an increasing trend 
(Wijnands et al. 2007; Wood 2013). A high and constantly growing share of private labels 
further increases competitive pressure on food processors (European Commission 2011). In the 
EU the food retail sector has already drawn attention of competition authorities with a focus of 
UHWDLOHU¶VEX\HUSRZHUYLV-à-vis the producers (European Competition Network, 2012, Davis 
and Reilly 2010, Dobson et al. 2003). The detected low degree of profit persistence in the food 
processing industry points towards the need for policy interventions at the retail level. 
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 Examples are the UK horsemeat scandal in 2013, the Belgian Dioxin scandal in 1999, the 2011 E. coli outbreak 




Moreover, the positive impact of firm size on profitability indicates that small firms are in a 
disadvantageous position. Thus, policy measures which address the food processing industry 
could focus on a decrease of administrative burdens particularly for the large number of small 
enterprises. Furthermore, measures that decrease unfavorable financial risk factors -particularly 
short term risk- might strengthen food processors and help to improve their competitiveness. 
Finally, the US results indicate that in times of economic crisis measures that facilitate access 
to long-term debt can counter the negative impact of the crisis.  
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 US  EU-28 EU-5 (Be, Fr, It, Sp, UK) 
Sales (bn. $)a 808.233 1,344.441 715.656 
No. of firms 30,384 289,199 160,504 
Employees (m.) 1.559 4.284 1.770 





Available size classes        
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Data sources: Eurostat (2014) and USDoC (2014) 
Notes: food processing industry in the EU-28 defined as NACE Rev. 1.1 division 15 i.e. µManufacture of food 
products and beverages¶86IRRG processing LQGXVWU\GHILQHGE\1$,&6FRGHVµ)RRGPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶and  
µ%HYHUDJHPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶ 
a Value of shipments for the US  
b Data based on identical size classes for the EU and US food processing industries is not available for firms  




























Table 2. Descriptive statistics of firm and industry characteristics  
 
US  EU-5 
(no. of firms = 104; ) Initial sample  (no. of firms=3,541; ) 
Matched sample  
(no of firms=1,395; ) 
Variable        Mean        Stdv.      Mean         Stdv.        Mean         Stdv. 
Firm characteristics  
ROA 0.032 0.142 0.054 0.097 0.052 0.059 
Firm size (m. $) 3,268.493 7,566.557  25.917 217.820 61.035 340.141 
Firm growtha  1.005 0.008 1.047 0.057 1.055 0.051 
Market share (%) 3.229 8.056 2.155 8.587 2.630 31.981 
Short-term risk 0.684 0.603 1.108 1.931 0.835 0.756 
Gearing 1.298 9.698 1.397 3.718 1.332 3.258 
Industry characteristics  
HHI 0.126 0.099 0.148 0.257 0.032 0.067 
Industry size (bn. $) 20.344 17.333 6.570  7.809 7.333  7.267 
Industry growtha 0.983 0.077 1.032 0.022 1.026 0.016 




















Firm variables: ROA = operating profit/total assets; Firm size = total assets; Firm growth = yearly growth rate of total assets; 
MS = firm sales/subsector sales; Short-term risk = current liabilities/current assets; Gearing = non-current 
liabilities/shareholder funds   
Industry variables: HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each NACE sector in the EU sample; Industry size = value of sales 
of NAICS/NACE industry; Industry growth = yearly growth rate of value of sales. 
Source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS, Eurostat (2014), Compustat and USDoC (2014). 
a Average growth rates are calculated using geometric means. 
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b To assure comparability both the EU and the US firms are assigned to size classes based on the SME definition of the European 
Commission (2005): Micro: total assets <$ 2.63 million; Small: total assets <$ 13.14 million; Medium: total assets <$ 56.51 
million. Firms are assigned to these size classes based on their total assets in the first available year   
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(1.98)** 
0.007    
(3.23)*** 




0.002     
(1.88)* 
Firm growth  0.379   
(1.36) 










Market share 0.000         
(0.07) 
0.003         
(1.01) 
0.000         
(0.01) 
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(1.43) 
Short-term risk -0.041  
 (-3.00)*** 
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(-3.24)*** 
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(-1.78)* 
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(2.99)*** 
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Industry size  -0.000  
(-1.45) 
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(0.80) 
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(0.89) 
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N 858 19,364 858 19,364 765 17,200 
'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHʌi,t
  
(profit deviating from the mean)   
Firm variables: Firm size = natural logarithm of total assets; Firm growth = yearly growth rate of total assets;    Market 
share = firm sales/industry value of sales; Short term risk = current liabilities/current assets; Gearing = non-current 
liabilities/shareholder funds. 
Industry variables: HHI=Herfindahl Index of NAICS/NACE industry; Industry size = sales of NAICS/NACE industry; 
Industry growth = growth rate of value of sales. 
Numbers in parentheses are z-/t-values based on robust standard errors.  











Table A1. Variable definitions 
Variables US  EU 
Firm characteristics  
Datasource Compustat 6WDQGDUGDQG3RRU¶V86 
(measured in $)a 
Bureau van Dijk`s AMADEUS  
(measured in ¼.b  
Profitability (ROA) Earnings Before Interests and Taxes 
(EBIT)/Total Assets  
Earnings Before Interests and Taxes  
(EBIT)/Total Assets  
Firm size (TA) Total Assets (Balance sheet total)  Total Assets (Balance sheet total)  
Firm growth  Yearly growth factor of Total Assets: 
TAt/TAt-1  
Yearly growth factor of Total Assets: 
TAt/TAt-1 
Firm sales Sales excluding discounts and allowances for 
credit given to customers 
Sales excluding stock variations and VAT 
Market share (Msh) Firm sales/6-digit NAICS industry sales Firm sales/4-digit NACE Industry sales 
Short-term risk Short Term Liabilities (STL)/Current Assets 
(CA) 
with STL = liabilities due within one year, 
including short-term debt and the current 
portion of long-term debt &  
CA = Cash and Short-Term Investments + 
Inventories + Receivables  
Current Liabilities (CL)/Current Assets (CA)  
 
with CL = Loans due within one year &     





Long-Term Debt (LTD)/Shareholder Equity 
(SHE) 
with LTD= debt obligations due more than one 
year from the company's balance sheet date &  
SHE = Common Equity + Preferred Stock 
 
Non-Current Liabilitiues (NCL)/Shareholder 
Funds (SF) 
with NCL =  Long Term Debt &  
        SF = Capital + other SF 
Industry characteristics  
Datasource: US Census Bureau: Annual Survey of 
Manufacturersc  
Eurostat: Structural Business Statisticsd 
Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) 





   





   
Industry size (IndS) Value of Shipments of 6-digit NAICS sector Total Sales of 4-digit NACE sector 
Industry growtha Yearly growth factor of 6-digit NAICS sales 
(S): IndSt/IndSt-1 




 Standard 	3RRU¶V&203867$71RUWK$PHULFD8VHU¶V*XLGH Data Definitions: www.compustat.com 
b
 Further information available from the AMADEUS Internet User Guide: www.bvdep.com. 
c
 https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/economic-census.html 
GKWWSHFHXURSDHXHXURVWDWGHGDWDGDWDEDVH 
 
 
